We apply a direct method to estimate tax evasion in Italy assuming that tax evaders might consider declaring a closer-to-true income in an anonymous interview. The methodology is applied to employed and self-employed taxpayers, combining the Survey of Household Income (SHIW) by the Bank of Italy and a large random sample of tax forms by SeCIT, both referred to incomes received in 2000. Posing particular attention to the post-stratification of the data, we find that tax evasion is consistently higher for self-employment income than for employment income: the difference ranges from about 7% in lower deciles to 27% around the mode. This analysis shows that a relevant level of tax evasion arises also at low levels of employment income, although some under-sampling problems need to be considered. A description of tax evaders is attempted using standard OLS and quantile regression methods and an evaluation of the redistribution and incidence effects of tax evasion among workers is provided.
Introduction
According to recent estimates between 27% and 48% of official Italian GDP is hidden. Among major OECD countries Italy presents the highest levels of tax evasion (Schneider, 2000a) . These figures rise concerns at a macro level, but they say little about who tax evaders are. Moreover, they do not provide much direction for policy.
Although measuring tax evasion is a formidable task - Schneider (2000b, p. 1) describes tax evasion measurement "as a scientific passion for knowing the unknown" -we believe that a better understanding of tax evasion is necessary. Tax evasion alters the competitiveness of the market, introduce iniquities among equals, modifies the outcomes of public policies. This paper attempts to provide an estimate of tax evasion combining two rich microeconomic data sets that are representative of the Italian population. Such a route has already been walked by other authors and Section 2 summarizes the main results so far about estimation of tax evasion in Italy, focussing mainly on microeconomic approaches. Here the main assumption is that tax payers who decide to hide to the tax authorities part of their income might consider declaring a more correct figure to an anonymous interviewer. Using this assumption we estimate tax evasion in Italy in year 2000 comparing income data from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) produced by the Bank of Italy with the tax forms random sample developed by SeCIT. This methodology requires great care to verify the consistency of the two data sets. A coherent definition of variables, a preliminary check of the main hypothesis by types of income and an analysis of how representative these two data sets are of the Italian population and of some of its sub-samples is contained in Section 3. This section also makes clear why we focussed on tax evasion by active people only. Estimation results are then provided and discussed in Section 4. As tax evasion behavior changes significantly at different income levels, especially for employees, an attempt to describe the characteristics of employment income distribution conditional on a set of individual and industry variables is undertaken using least squares and quantile regression tools. In Section 5 the effect of the estimated tax evasion on work income is analyzed using a tax-benefit microsimulation model and standard indices of redistribution, progressivity and tax incidence.
Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses some policy implications of the results obtained.
Available evidence about tax evasion in Italy
Tax evasion can be estimated using a direct or an indirect approach. Indirect methods estimate tax evasion considering it equal to the difference between aggregated macro indicators (e.g the discrepancy between income and expenditures or the difference between the actual demand for money and the demand for money estimated in absence of taxes). Direct methods aim at estimating tax evasion through the use of sample survey micro-data based on voluntary participation or the results of the auditing activity of tax authorities. In contrast to indirect methods, direct methods are more suitable to analyze tax evasion at the micro level and they can highlight directions for policy.
Some of these methods have been applied to provide a measure of tax evasion in Italy. Among those who used indirect methods, Schneider (2000a) used the currency demand approach, Zizza (2002) also the factorial analysis. Zizza estimates the share of the underground economy (excluding illegal and criminal activities) on GDP for the years 1984-2000 between a maximum of 17.6% (1991) and a minimum of 14.3% (2000) . According to Schneider (2000a) , where estimates include also illegal and criminal activities, the share of the underground economy on the italian GDP is very high and increasing (from 25.8% in 1994 to 27.8% in 1998) , the highest rate among the OECD countries. Calzaroni (2000) , Bernasconi and Marenzi (1997) , Marenzi (1996) , Cannari et al. (1995) and Bordignon and Zanardi (1997) used direct methods. Calzaroni (2000) estimates labor supply and labor demand functions by sectors using household and firm surveys, respectively, and compares results at the national and the regional level. The difference between the two is considered to be the number of the irregular workers. This figure, multiplied for the average sectorial productivity estimated for regular workers gives a first measure of the underground economy. The overall incidence of the underground economy is calculated complementing this figure with coefficients correcting for the underestimation of the turnover and the balancing between aggregated input and output. The results indicate that, for 1998, the share of the underground economy on GDP in Italy is between 14.7 and 15.4%. Cannari et al. (1995) , Bernasconi and Marenzi (1997) and Marenzi (1996) use a different approach: they assume that individuals report a more truthful income to an anonymous interviewer than to the tax authorities. Hence, when income data recorded in the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) -produced by the Bank of Italy (BI) -is larger than that recorded in the analysis of tax formsproduced by the Ministry of Finance (MF) -the difference between SHIW and MF disposable income is considered as hidden income. Cannari et al. (1995) and Marenzi (1996) considered years 1989 and 1991, respectively. The estimate of tax evasion is performed for different groups of tax payers, identified by their main income (employment, self-employment, pension, etc.) . Bernasconi and Marenzi (1997) find evidence of positive tax evasion in the two first deciles of employment income (27.2% in the first decile and 10.2% in the second) and a slight underreporting in the following ones. According to the same estimates entrepreneurs show a much higher, but decreasing with the level of income, level of tax evasion. In particular, in the first four deciles of income tax evasion is higher than 50% (81% in the first decile), and remains above 40% across all the income deciles. Also professionals show levels of tax evasion decreasing in the level of income, with an estimated evasion of 87.1% in the first decile, but lower than 20% in the last 5 deciles. In Cannari et al. (1995) tax evasion is on average zero for total employment income (for this kind of taxpayers an estimate by decile is not provided) and decreasing in the level of income for members of the art or professions and for entrepreneurs. Bernasconi and Marenzi (1997) provide also an estimate of redistributive effects using a taxbenefit microsimulation model. They showed that had evasion not incurred, the vertical effect of taxation would have increased and the horizontal and re-ranking effect would have decreased by large proportions.
This methodology relies heavily on the hypothesis that the SHIW data set is representative of the population and of its subgroups. As MF data refers to the population, a measure of tax evasion based on this methodology requires the SHIW data to be a good approximation of the population. This requirement must be verified carefully.
An estimate of tax evasion stemming from the comparison between the SHIW and the MF data also requires that income variables are defined consistently. Cannari et al. (1995) , Bernasconi and Marenzi (1997) and Marenzi (1996) use total net income by group of taxpayers. However, the SHIW data set is quite reliable for the measurement of work income but it is much less so for other types of income such as capital, estate and building income (Cannari and D'Alessio, 1992; Brandolini, 1999) . This is due to two main reasons: first, these data are collected at the household level and they can only be imputed to the individual taxpayer; second, there is a tendency to misestimate the true value of these incomes, which is probably not voluntary and however common also to other similar surveys.
Other direct methods to estimate tax evasion, although possible in other countries, have seldom been used in Italy. Bordignon and Zanardi (1997) Data limitation is also the main reason why a direct approach like that suggested by Pissarides and Weber (1989) has never been published for Italy. Pissarides and Weber (1989) use the British FES data and assume that income and expenditures are reported accurately by employees whose employer filed their income report.
They estimate the expenditure function for these households as the true relation between income and expenditure given a set of individual and household characteristics. Assuming that expenditure are reported correctly also by other households, an estimate of their income is then estimated, and consequently of their tax evasion. However, the SHIW data are not suited for their approach, mainly because expenditure variables suffer large measurement error and no better data have been produced so far.
3 Applying a direct methodology: consistency checks In this paper a direct approach to tax evasion estimation is used, as previously used for Italy by Marenzi (1996) and Cannari et al. (1995) . The basic assumption is that an income receiver who decides to evade tax payment will under-report her taxable income to tax authorities but declare the true income, or at least a closer approximation to the true income, to an interviewer who grants anonymity. As survey-based data tend to grant anonymity to increase the probability of participation in the survey and of truthful declarations, the comparison of income distribution using tax records and survey-based data sets allows one to have a picture of tax evasion behavior. However, before using a direct methodology to estimate tax evasion some preliminary checks on the data available and their consistency are needed.
The data sets we will use are the 2000 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (henceforth, SHIW00), which reports data on incomes received during the year 2000, and the stratified random sample of individual tax forms referred to income received in year 2000 (henceforth, MF00).
The SHIW00, published by the Bank of Italy, collects detailed micro data about 8,001 households and 22,268 individuals on disposable income, consumption, labor market, monetary and financial variables. The sample was drawn in two stages (municipalities and households) with the stratification of the primary sampling units (municipalities) by units and size, to make it representative of the national population. Within each stratum, all municipalities with population of more than 40,000 were selected, while smaller towns were randomly included. Households were then selected randomly and a sampling weight, defined as the inverse of the probability of inclusion of each household in the sample, was attached to each observation. The survey is meant to be representative of the national household population: detailed information is available for each member of the household. The Bank of Italy, after some consistency checks, computes a set of sampling weights to gross-up estimates to population totals (Banca d'Italia, 2002) .
Althought the MF00 is not available to the authors all requested elaborations were kindly performed at SeCIT (Tax auditing office -Ministry of Finance) on a very large data set (over 250,000 taxpayers). This data set is a non-proportional random sample of the population of tax forms 2 and it is representative of the population of tax payers for all levels of incomes (for more details on MF00, see Di Nicola and Monteduro, 2004) .
The main differences between the two data sets are the following: (a) the SHIW00 is a survey based on volutary participation, the MF00 is a random sample of tax forms that all Italian income receivers are obliged to present; (b) the reference sampling unit is the household in the SHIW00, the individual in the MF00; (c) in SHIW00 there is information on income net of taxes and social contributions (which can only be simulated by using a tax-benefit microsimulation model), in MF00 gross and net income, as well as tax credit, tax deductions and compulsory social contribution paid are fully known; (d) under-sampling of high income households might be relevant in the SHIW00 as non-response issue increases with income (see referenecs below), in the MF00 it is not as participation is not voluntary; (e) a large range of information of individual and household characteristics is available in the SHIW00, while mainly fiscal variables are available in the MF00 and there is no way to recover household or family composition from these data, even using the information on fiscally-dependent relatives; (f) the SHIW00 and the MF00 are both micro-data sets, and the aggregation bias that would arise in comparing household micro-data sets with aggregated fiscal tables 3 can be avoided; (g) the SHIW00 collects recall information (i.e. the interviewers are asked to recall the incomes they received in the previous year, without providing evidence) and can be affected by nonvoluntary approximation error and misreporting, the MF00 presents no approximation error as report is based on official documentation and, at most, it should include only taxpayer mistakes in filling in tax form and tax form data elaboration mistakes.
The reasons that make SHIW00 and MF00 particularly suited for a direct methodology of tax evasion estimation are that: (a) both present data on income received in year 2000 and all bias due to approximate updating procedure can be avoided; (b) they are representative of the national population and analysis of tax compliance can be performed by regional areas, by age, by type of income received.
Although SHIW00 and MF00 are two almost ideal data sets for a direct approach to tax evasion, it is important that some a priori checks are performed. They include: the consistent definition of income variables to be compared; the verification of the main hypothesis of the direct approach estimation, that is that there is a positive difference between the data reported to the anonymous interviewer and to the tax authorities; and the analysis of how representative the data sets are of the total population, the post-stratification issue. , 2004) . We ruled out the possibility of tax evasion in pension income as an unlikely event and discrepancy of data could only be ascribed to data misreporting (which could be relevant as age increases). Only employment and self-employment income was considered as it accounts for 92% of the total IRPEF tax base, excluding pension income. Moreover, the recording of other types of income in SHIW00 is highly unreliable D'Alessio, 1990, 1992; Brandolini and Cannari, 1994) .
The definition of employment income SHIW00 is relatively straightforward and definition is consistent with MF00. Self-employment income presents some challenges due to the difficulties to disentangle partnership income from the SHIW00 consistent with the definition of partnership income in the MF00. Hence, the selfemployment income is defined as the sum of member of the professions, sole proprietors, free lance, family business and active shareholder/partner (of unincorporated companies -i.e. S.n.c. and S.a.s. -only).
Total employment income are on average the same in the two data sets, while self-employment income is over 20% larger in the SHIW00 than in the MF00.
The post-stratification issue
It is well known that the non-response bias is larger the larger is the rate of nonresponse and the larger are the differences between respondents and non-respondents (see among others Little and Rubin, 1987) . Unfortunately the non-response rate in the SHIW00 is over 50% (Banca d'Italia, 2002) and some studies showed that the non-response decision is not random. Cannari and D'Alessio (1992) analyzed the non-response bias in the SHIW using the second wave of the panel sub-sample (the first wave was interviewed in 1987, the second in 1989). Knowing the characteristics of those who refused to respond again in 1989, they expanded the results to the whole sample. They found that non-response is more frequent in households who reside in urban areas and in the North. The participation rates decline as income rises and household size decreases, while the relationship with the age of the head of the households is ambiguous. D'Alessio and Faiella (2002) also showed that nonresponse behavior is dependent on net financial wealth. They found this result using a supplementary sample of about 2,000 households, clients of a leading commercial bank. Although the sample can hardly be considered representative of the whole population and sub-samples size are not very large, individual with financial wealth larger than Lit 1 billion (about e0.5 million) have about half the response rates of other groups. D'Alessio and Faiella (2002) used also alternative methodologies reaching the conclusion that non-response behavior is not random, and is more frequent among wealthier households.
For a direct methodology to tax evasion it is important that the characteristics of the SHIW00 are as close as possible to those of the population. As the MF00 is not affected by non-response bias as it is not a survey but a random sample from the population of tax forms, we used a post-stratification procedure for the SHIW00 only. The post-stratification procedure computes a new weight that adjusts for differences between the sample data and the characteristics of the population to be modelled, reflecting differential non-responses between different groups in the sample. It involves stratifying the sample, after the data have been collected, by some relevant characteristics, and applying known proportions.
In more detail, the post-stratification procedure we used consists in assigning to each unit in a sample of dimension N a weight p j , with j = 1, ..., N , such that some chosen statistics of interest calculated on the weighted sample coincide with the population statistics. The procedure is trivial if we need to reconcile the sample with the population using only one discrete statistic, s k with k = 1, ..., K, such as family types or income ranges. In this case, we compute the probability of having the characteristic s k in the sample, say P (s k ), and make it equal to the probability of having the same characteristic in the population, say p(s k ). If the dimension of the sample and of the population are N and n respectively, then the post-stratification weight is
e. the size of the cell with characteristic s k in the population divided by the size of the cell with characteristic s k in the sample. If more variables are included for the post-stratification procedure then the interactions between the different variables (i.e. the their joint distribution) should be considered. However, this conflicts with available information from external sources, which in general do not report the joint distribution of population variables but only the totals for each variable. For instance, it is generally possible to know the total number of singleparent families and the total number of self-employed in the population but not how many single-parent families have self-employment income. Hence, the conditions imposed on the weights p j are far less stringent than in the "full information" case we would have if the joint distribution were known, and in general there are many possible sets of weights p j achieving the desired adjustment. To choose among them Atkinson et al. (1988) suggest the requirement that given a data set of dimension N , with original sampling weights q j , j = 1, 2, ..., N , the set of post-stratification weights p j have the least deviation from original weights, q j . The original weights could reflect the sampling procedure or be uniform. Both post-stratification and initial weights have to sum up to the population size:
and post-stratification weights sum up to the sample dimension, they first have to be multiplied by n/N . It is then common practice to impose the condition that the new weights minimize the distance from initial weights. In order to avoid negative weights, Atkinson et al. (1988) suggest minimizing a measure of distance derived from information theory (see for instance Cowell, 1980) :
As for the optimal number of control totals to be included, no result is currently available. Although it is more common to face the problem of not having enough external sources than of having too many, Sutherland (1989, p. 15) warns on the risk of increasing the variance of weights since the larger the number of control totals becomes, the smaller the number of observations in each "cell"(i.e. with each combination of characteristics being controlled for). Moreover, a particular set of post-stratification weights can be able to closely reflect the characteristics of the population as for some variables but not for others.
The SHIW00 is post-stratified using the variables sex, age class, area and dimension of the town of residence (p. 40 Banca d'Italia, 2002) . However, it is not clearly stated what methodology was used and which control totals (e.g. which age groups) have been used. Table 1 shows how much does the weighted sample differ from population totals using the post-stratification weight provided in SHIW00. It can be seen that, using the BI weights, the differences between the post-stratified and actual figures are small (less than 1%) as far as sex and area of residence (North-West (NW), North-East (NE), Center (C) and South (S)) are considered, but it becomes worryingly large for age groups (especially by area of residence) and schooling. Moreover the post-stratified figures obtained using the SHIW00 weights are rather different from those obtained using MF00. This is probably due to the fact that SHIW00 weights are calculated using the control totals provided by ISTAT. Since ISTAT control totals differ from those provided by the MF, there could be a problem with post-stratified simulations. For instance the effects of an hypothetical tax policy that affected mainly self-employed would probably be overestimated as these groups are over-represented using the BI weights. All these issues are of particular relevance whenever an analysis of income by population sub-groups is performed. For these reasons a set of alternative post-stratification weights were estimated using the same methodology as Atkinson et al. (1988) 
using control totals found in Ministero delle
Finanze (2004) and ISTAT (2004) . In particular the new post-stratified weights are consistent with ISTAT for the main socio-demographic characteristics, while they refer to MF00 data for the number and the geographical distribution of employed and self-employed. In this way the weighted SHIW00 can be considered consistent with the Italian population of tax-payers and can be used for a direct estimation of tax evasion.
Estimating tax evasion: the results
Using a direct approach to tax evasion estimation, the positive difference between disposable income from voluntary survey and tax forms data is considered concealed taxable income, which gives rise to tax evasion. The direct estimation methodology is applied to employment and self-employment income, as defined in Section 3.1, net of all taxes and compulsory social contributions.
We believe that this difference is a conservative measure of underground income (i.e. income from tax avoidance and evasion concerning legal activities) and of informal income (i.e. income from individual activity with low level of organization, based on individual and familiar relationship, such as baby sitting, domestic cleaning, etc. believe that total tax evaders are not among respondents of the SHIW00.
The exercise we perform here is similar to that of Bernasconi and Marenzi (1997) and it can be seen as an update of that paper. However, our work differs from theirs as we focus only on employment and self-employment 5 income at the individual level and because we carefully consider the issue of post-stratification to population totals.
Although the methodology was applied comparing the SHIW00 and MF00 by centiles, results are shown in deciles for clarity reasons. The percentage of concealed income is estimated as the ratio between the mean net income within a SHIW00 cen-5 Recall definitions provided in Section 3.1.
tile and the mean after-tax income within the corresponding MF00 centile. Table 2 shows the estimates of concealed income for employee and self-employed in the whole sample by deciles. The percentage of concealed income is very high in both cases in the first three deciles of the distribution (although it is higher for self-employed than for employed). In the last six deciles the two distributions show instead a different pattern. Concealed employment income goes to zero, and becomes negative after the median; self-employment income shows a positive (though decreasing) pattern of evaded income. At any decile, a larger proportion of self-employment income is concealed compared to employment income. The difference is larger around the median -about 27% -and it is smaller at low levels of income -less than 10% -(see Figure 1 ). Table 3 : Tax evasion (in %) by type of work income and by area. Our calculations on SHIW00 and MF00, with post-stratified weight Finally, considering the estimates of tax evasion for different age classes, Table   4 shows that the percentage of employment income concealed is much higher for young (between 18 and 25 years of age) than for older people. This evidence does not emerge with respect to self-employment income, where people aged between 26-40 show the higher levels of concealed income. Table 4 : Tax evasion (in %) by type of work income and by age groups. Our calculations on SHIW00 and MF00, with post-stratified weight
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"Striking results! Any explanation?"
Let us discuss our main results
6
. Some readers might be surprised by the large proportion of taxable income that is concealed and some even by the simple existence of tax evasion among employees. Some others by the fact that the share of hidden employment income becomes increasingly negative with income after the median.
These readers may be pointing out the same problem: that of under-sampling of some households in the SHIW00.
As we rule out the possibility that rich taxpayers declare to the tax authorities more income than what they actually earn, we believe that a negative percentage of concealed income over the median can reasonably be explained by the fact that the response rate to SHIW00 of rich households decreases with income. Hence the under-sampling of these households reduces the thickness of the higher tail of the income distribution in the SHIW00 and makes estimation more and more conservative as income becomes larger than the median. Our results are then consistent with those provided by Cannari and D'Alessio (1992) and D'Alessio and Faiella (2002) that propensity to accept an interview is decreasing with income (recall Section 3.2). However, our results seems to suggest that a certain level of under-sampling arises also among the poorest households. If the response rate was not decreasing with income but it was inverted-U-shaped, than also the bottom part of the income distribution would be less thick and evasion estimation upward biased at lower levels of income. There could be possible reasons why income could be correlated with the response rate (e.g. value of time is increasing with income, lack of confidence or shame on own achievements could be larger on poorer households) but further research on the response rate to the SHIWs is beyond the scope of this where, according to our results, income concealment is higher. Using the SHIW00 for employees only we describe the probability of employees to be at different levels of income given their personal characteristics by estimating a (log) wage equation conditional on individual characteristics for employees only. Results are presented using ordinary least squares (OLS) and quantile regression estimates in Table 6 .
OLS estimate the mean of log wage conditional on individual characteristics. It can be seen that the average log wage is higher if the the individual is the householder, it is increasing with age and experience and their returns are moderately decreasing 9 , females earn 21% less than males, employees from the South earn 17%
8 It must be noted that, in contrast to our assumptions, irregular workers recorded by ISTAT include also workers who are unknown to tax authorities.
9 The square of age and experience are highly significative but very small. and 10% less than those from the North and the Center, respectively. Also the occupation variable are highly significant and present a reasonable sign and magnitude. The sector-of-occupation variables show that ceteris paribus, employees in agriculture and domestic services to household earn the least. Finally, the average wage is 41% larger if the occupation is full time, it is 15% larger if it is tenured, it is 58% larger if it is a yearly occupation.
We use quantile regression to document the employees heterogeneity in the way wages respond to variations in those variables which are expected to affect them (e.g. gender, experience, industry attributes, etc.). In contrast to mean regression, quantile regression allows the study of the effect of a set of covariates on the whole distribution, hence to estimate the workers' heterogeneity upon wages. The statistical model used here specifies the τ -th quantile of the conditional distribution of (log) wages (y) given a set of covariates (x) as a linear function of the covariates: Point interval and inferences about the coefficients of (1) are performed using the technique in Koenker and Bassett (1978) , and results for some quantiles are shown in Table 6 . Figure 2 depicts results of the same model for more quantiles and only for those coefficients that differ the most from the OLS ones. It shows that lower deciles are more likely to be occupied by young people and by residents in the Center and in the South. People with full time, year-round occupation at lower quantiles have an average income between 60% and 110% larger than people with part-time and temporary occupation. At lower quantiles the occupation premium of being young manager/cadre or senior manager is much smaller than the average.
Effects of tax evasion on incidence and progressivity indices
Results presented in Section 4 rise a set of concerns about incidence and progressivity of taxation: they show that the proportion of income that is hidden to tax authorities is not evenly distributed across different income groups and across different types of incomes.
As in Bernasconi and Marenzi (1997) we assume that people belonging to the same income interval and with equal type of income have the same compliance behavior. In other words, we suppose that there is no re-ranking and horizontal iniquity within the same income interval but only across them. "It is evident that the difference between the two data sources (BI and MF), computed by decile, is interpretable as evasion of the decile only if it is assumed that evasion did not move taxpayers from a decile to another before and after tax evasion" (Bernasconi and Marenzi, 1997, p. 24) .
As the SHIW00 records only disposable income after all taxes and social contributions, a microsimulation model is used to simulate before-tax income as well as to perform simulations. The TABEITA00 model used is a static microsimulation models that simulate personal taxation (IRPEF and "imposte sostitutive") using the SHIW00
10
. In order to avoid overestimating the amount of tax paid and of before-tax income, only income net of (imputed) tax evasion is used to simulate 10 For details about the model, see Fiorio and D'Amuri (2005) before tax evasion. The imputation of tax evasion is taken from a table similar 11 to Table 2 .
Results of the simulation are analyzed using some indices for the measurement of the effects of taxation and the Gini coefficient, before and after taxes. The Kakwani index is a very popular index of progressivity: it measures the departure from proportionality as the difference between the concentration coefficient of tax C t and the Gini index of before-tax income, G y :
For large samples the minimum value of the Kakwani index is −(1 + G y ) and the maximum value is 1 − G y . The first case happens when the poorest person pays all the tax (C t = −1), the second when all the tax is paid by the richest person, leading to maximal progressivity (Kakwani, 1977) .
The redistributive effect looks at the shift from before-tax to after-tax income.
With no re-ranking, the after-tax Lorenz curve coincides with the after-tax income concentration curve. The Reynolds-Smolensky index (RS) is equal to the difference between the Gini coefficient of before-tax income (G y ) and the concentration coefficient of after-tax income (C y−t ) (Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977) . In absence of reranking it is the reduction of the Gini coefficient achieved by the tax. It is also equal to the product of a progressivity index (e.g. K t ) and the average tax on net income (t/1 − t):
Hence the redistributive effect is determined by disproportionality and tax incidence. However, as the re-ranking effects are likely to occur with the tax system, the Reynolds-Smolonsky index, which is an indicator of vertical equity, should be written as the sum of a redistributive effect (RE) and a re-ranking effect (RR) (Lambert, 1993, p. 185): 11 The only difference is that Table 2 shows estimation by deciles while imputation is by centiles.
These indices allow us to measure the importance of our estimates of work tax evasion on the progressivity, redistribution and incidence of personal income taxation. Consistently with the rest of the paper we focussed on work income receivers only. Let us denote the evaded income -as estimated in Section 4 -with E, the before-tax income declared to fiscal authorities with BT, the net personal income tax applying the tax code on BT with PIT, the after-tax income with AT (AT = BT -PIT). Finally we denote the true BT (TBT = BT + E) with TBT, and the true AT (i.e. the disposable income after all PIT is paid on TBT) with TAT. Using the estimates of Section 4, two sets of incomes were then simulated: (a) the "status quo", where some conceal part of their work income; (b) the "ideal world ", where no income is concealed. The following exercise was performed:
The "status quo":
Step 1 The net income as declared in SHIW and deducted by E is fed into TABEITA00 to obtain BT;
Step 2 Using TABEITA00, PIT and AT are obtained as an output of the microsimulation model.
Step 3 TBT and TAT are then computed adding E to both BT and AT.
The "ideal world ":
Step 1 as in "status quo";
Step 2 TBT is computed as the sum of BT and E.
Step 3 TABEITA00 is used on TBT to compute TAT.
Step 1 in the exercise above is necessary as, by definition, no tax is paid on E and the SHIW00 data do not provide information about PIT paid. TBT and TAT are then used in (4) to analyze the effects of income concealment on personal income taxation. Table 7 presents results. In the "status quo", the tax relative to net income is equal to 24.4% and it would be 5.1% larger if no income was concealed. In other words, the average tax rate would increase from 19.6% to 20.4%, increasing tax revenues (only from those receiving work income) by 3.9%. The redistributive effect would however be slightly smaller in the "ideal world " as the departure from proportionality (the K t index) would be about 9% smaller in the "ideal world ". This result -together with a (slightly) larger Gini index in the "ideal world " after tax-incomemight be puzzling to some readers, who would expect evasion to increase inequities.
However they should recall that the direct methodology applied in Section 4 found large evasion in lower deciles of employment income. Moreover these indices were computed using the subsample of those declaring some work income only: work tax evasion would certainly have a lower effect in case the whole sample was considered. Table 7 : Indices of progressivity, redistribution and tax incidence.
Policy indications and concluding remarks
This paper provides an estimate of work tax evasion in Italy in year 2000 using a direct methodology. The analysis was performed on work income only, as other types of income are recorded with much greater approximations in available survey data. A great care was put on the post-stratification of the sample to population totals, as grossed-up statistics using weights included in SHIWs present relevant differences with population totals. Tax evasion estimation is performed by centiles and discussed by deciles, as this allows us to partition the income distribution in "close equals", that is necessary for comparing two different microeconomic data sets.
After detailed analysis of the two data sets concerning the variable definition, the verification of the main hypothesis of the methodology and the post-stratification to population totals, results show the following main results: (a) employment income is hidden to tax authorities at low levels of income but evasion rate decreases constantly and becomes negligible after the median income; (b) Self-employed taxpayers hide a consistently larger share of their income than employees in the corresponding income decile. The difference is over 7% for bottom deciles and becomes around 27% around the mode, where the estimates are less likely to be affected by under-sampling bias.
A significantly higher rate of tax evasion among self-employed was already pointed out by other authors' analysis using early 1990's data, however the relevance of tax evasion among low income employees using direct methodologies estimation was never clearly pointed out before. Although our estimates of tax evasion at bottom deciles could be biased upward because of the under-sampling problem with the SHIW00, our story is consistent with what found by other independent institutions.
But who are these previously unnoticed tax evaders? What are their motivations to evade personal income tax? What public policies can be undertaken to reduce a phenomenon that is likely to cause inequalities among equals?
Here we fully answer to the first question only, and we suggest some answers to the following ones. Using econometric tools we show that those more likely to be in the bottom part of the income distribution are young, female, non-married, blue-collar workers, working in the agricultural sector or providing domestic services to households. Moreover we also showed that employees with fixed term contracts, and working part-time are more likely to receive lower-than-average wages. An analysis of the conditional distribution of employment income using quantile regression techniques shows that these latter variables are particularly relevant at lower quantiles.
A partial answer to the motivation of employees to evade personal income tax comes from an analysis of tax incidence and tax progressivity, which was performed using a tax-benefit microsimulation model. Focussing on the sub-sample of working taxpayers, if no tax evasion occurred at any level of employment and self-employment income, average tax rate would be 4% larger, the tax incidence on net incomes would be 5.1% larger. The tax would however be less progressive inducing an overall negative redistributive effect.
In other words, work income tax evasion allows some workers, namely those in part-time, fixed-term, under-qualified occupation to supplement their meager income. Shall we then close an eye, or "smile indulgently" on tax evasion, as Cowell (1987, p. 195) was asking? Cowell suggests that considerations of horizontal equity might be an essential prop to the anti-evasion argument. We also add some final considerations. People who do not pay taxes generally also evade social contribution, hence reducing the chances of supporting their income if or when in need. This might be the rational choice of a forward looking agent who gambles on his chances of living in good health and of receiving good returns from investing her hidden income in performing capital markets. Or, it might be the only option of someone who does not have a large bargaining power on the job market. If the second possibility cannot be ruled out -as our knowledge of the Italian contest suggests us -there is room for discussion about what to do next. We believe that an indulgent smile on evasion should not be an option.
